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THE EERA AND THE FINAL DECISION
William E. Brown*
The enactment of this chapter . . . shall not be construed
as prohibiting a public school employer from making the
final decision with regard to all matters specified in Sec-
tion 3543.2.'
INTRODUCTION
The Educational Employment Relations Act of 19762
(EERA) purports to establish a system of collective bargaining
for California school district employees working in grades kin-
dergarten through fourteen. In addition, recent legislation has
expanded the jurisdiction of the Board established under the
EERA to provide a similar form of bargaining for state employ-
ees and to change the name of the agency to the Public Em-
ployment Relations Board (PERB).1
It is the thesis of this article that the California Legisla-
ture, because of competing interests and compromises made
during the course of the passage of the EERA, fell far short of
enacting true bilateral collective bargaining for public school
employees. Indeed, with the exception of mandated recommen-
dations in the fact-finding process when third-party interven-
tion occurs, the end result of "bargaining" under the EERA is
almost identical with the result under the antecedent Winton
Act provisions, which governed public school employer-
employee relations for a decade in California.4 The EERA does
not extend the right to strike to the employees covered,5 nor
* B.A., 1955, San Diego State University; J.D., 1964, University of San Diego
School of Law; Member, California Bar.
1. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3549 (West Supp. 1978).
2. Id. §§ 3540-3549.3.
3. Id. § 3512.41.
4. 1965 Cal. Stats., ch. 2041, § 2, at 4660 (amended by 1970 Cal. Stats., ch. 1412,
§ 6, at 683; 1970 Cal. Stats., ch. 1413, § 6, at 2686; repealed 1975). "The enactment of
this article shall not be construed . . . as prohibiting a public school employer from
making the final decision with regard to all matters specified under [the negotiations
sectionl." Id. at 4663.
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3549 (West Supp. 1978). The California Supreme Court has
not spoken on the right of school district employees to strike; however, several District
Courts of Appeal have uniformly held that the right does not exist. See Pasadena
Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1977).
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does it provide for other forms of compulsory or mandatory
settlement of interest disputes. It cannot be gainsaid that true
collective bargaining does not embrace the notion that one
party or the other may "make the final decision" with regard
to the subject matter of bargaining. Therefore, it must be as-
sumed that strong policy considerations have prevented the
California Legislature from extending true collective bargain-
ing to such public employees. It is the opinion of the author
that halfway measures on the road to true bilateral collective
bargaining in the public sector may produce hostility and tur-
moil between the parties and that true bilateral bargaining for
public employees, with all its benefits and burdens, would lead
to stability in a positive way.
By comparison, the Oregon experience with public em-
ployee bargaining may be instructive. The Oregon Act' pro-
vides a system of collective bargaining in omnibus form for all
public employees in the state. When the parties fail to reach
agreement at the bargaining table, third-party intervention is
provided in the form of mediation, fact-finding, and post-fact-
finding mediation. As in California, the fact-finding is with
recommendations to the parties, and such recommendations
must be made public within a specified period following their
receipt.
The Oregon Act does not stop there, however. Under that
statute, employees have the right to strike so long as ten days'
notice is given of the anticipated work stoppage. The employer
may then decide to take the strike and "tough it out," or in the
alternative, apply to the court of highest jurisdiction in the
county for an order restraining the work stoppage.7 If after a
hearing the court determines that the public welfare, health,
and safety would be endangered by the work stoppage, the
court may grant injunctive relief to the employer-applicant.
However, where the relief sought is granted, the court must
refer the controverted matters to final and binding arbitration
within ten days. Because of the abhorrence of management and
most employee organizations for a process where an outsider in
effect "writes" the contract for the parties, very few disputes
have reached this stage in Oregon. Instead, the parties have
6. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650 (1977).
7. Legislation enacted in 1977 requires that the employee union for organization
specify the exact date upon which the strike will commence. This revision was made
to prevent union notices which stated that the strike would begin "on or after" a
certain date. Public Employee's Rights and Benefits, ch. 243, § 243.650 (1977).
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settled their differences at the bargaining table with or without
mediation and fact-finding, resulting in fewer strikes in Oregon
after the enactment of the Act in 1973 than when the state had
no law on public employee bargaining. In the public schools,
there have been less than half a dozen strikes by certificated
employees and only one classified employees' strike.
Oregon did not have a "Winton Act Era" as did California.
It was hoped that the Winton Act experience in California
would provide the parties with experience in the give-and-take
mode of bargaining. It is questionable, however, that the ten
years of experience under Winton were productive in light of
the strikes and unrest presently being experienced in the school
districts of the state. It may be that while the bargaining pro-
cess has developed in sophistication over the years, the absence
of effective interest dispute resolution machinery has caused
unrest and turmoil in school labor relations from the inception
of the EERA.
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS
Prior to 1935, pre-Wagner Act legislation' gave employees
the right to organize and bargain collectively, but the absence
of any enforcement power rendered the right virtually useless.
Management by and large ignored the rights of employees,
formed company unions to go through the motions of bargain-
ing, and discharged employees who took their "rights" seri-
ously. The turmoil in labor relations that ensued during the
early part of this century persuaded Congress to enact new
legislation in 19351 pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. 0
The rights extended to employees under the Wagner Act
and continued in succeeding legislation included (1) the right
to organize, (2) the right to bargain collectively, and (3) the
right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other concerted activi-
ties." This package of rights was considered essential to estab-
lish a balance of bargaining power between employer and em-
8. Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898); Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970)); Railway Labor Act, ch. 347,
44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)); Norris-LaGuardia Act,
ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970)).
9. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1970)).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
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ployee and to avoid the inadequacies of the earlier laws on the
subject. The private sector knows no "final decision" power in
the hands of one party to the bargaining process.
In the California public schools the balance of power has
been further restricted by a scope of bargaining provision which
limits bargaining to certain enumerated topics. 2 Although the
"wedge words" matters relating to contained in the scope sec-
tion may operate to expand the scope of bargaining under the
Act, if the scope of bargaining is strictly confined to the matters
enumerated, the governance of curriculum and other educa-
tionally related matters will be reserved to the publicly elected
school board members. In instances where the scope has been
enlarged in contract talks, such expansion has taken place at
the bargaining table where school boards have acted in hopes
of avoiding conflict situations. No major scope decision has
been made by the PERB in the two years since enactment of
the legislation. 13 Almost certainly the scope question will be
before the courts following PERB consideration of the matter.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF POWER
In the private sector when impasse in bargaining has been
reached, the employer may unilaterally implement its last pro-
posal. For this reason unions resist declarations of impasse, and
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
The scope of representation shall be limited to matters relating to
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. "Terms and conditions of employment" mean health and welfare
benefits as defined by Section 53200, leave, transfer and reassignment
policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, procedures to be
used for the evaluation of employees, organizational security pursuant to
Section 3546, procedures for processing grievances pursuant to Sections
3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7, and 3548.8, and the layoff of probationary certifi-
cated school district employees, pursuant to Section 44959.5 of the Edu-
cation Code. In addition, the exclusive representative of certificated per-
sonnel has the right to consult on the definition of educational objectives,
the determination of the content of courses and curriculum, and the
selection of textbooks to the extent such matters are within the discretion
of the public school employer under the law. All matters not specifically
enumerated are reserved to the public school employer and may not be a
subject of meeting and negotiating, provided that nothing herein may be
construed to limit the right of the public school employer to consult with
any employees or employee organization on any matter outside the scope
of representation.
13. In Jefferson School Dist., [1978] 2 Pus. EMPLOYEE REP. CAL. (LRP) 354 (July
13, 1978) and Healdsburg Union School Dist., [1978] 2 Pus. EMPLOYEE REP. CAL.
(LRP) 384 (July 14, 1978), the Hearing Officers made exhaustive analyses of the scope
questions in reaching their decisions. Both decisions have been appealed to the PERB.
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much case law has developed surrounding factual situations
wherein impasse does or does not exist. Under the EERA, little
doubt exists as to whether impasse is present because one party
or the other has openly declared such status, the agency has
investigated and appointed a state mediator, and such person
has appeared to mediate the dispute. Therefore, the local board
of education, taking a page from the private sector and relying
on California Government Code section 3549, may be tempted,
once mediation and fact-finding have been completed, to get
on with the process and make the final decision. The language
of section 3549 quoted at the outset of this article may act to
lull the school board into a false sense of security and precipi-
tate action, thereby increasing the danger of turmoil in
employer-employee relations. This potential exists because the
board of education presumes that the law enables it to make
the final decision once the motions of mediation and fact-
finding have been completed. On the other hand, the exclusive
representative reads the law to provide it with parity at the
bargaining table. This perception may prompt the latter to
engage in other concerted activities in the form of strikes or
slowdowns in order to bring its viewpoint home to the em-
ployer. Both "perceptions" of power inexorably lead to conflict
situations.
Imagine a case in which a school board and an exclusive
representative of teachers reopened the topics of wages and
class size in the second year of a two-year contract which pro-
vided for such openers. The mediator refused to certify the
matter to fact-finding,' and following impasse declaration and
mediation sessions the board made the "final decision" to im-
plement its last salary offer (in the private sector sense) and
to take no action on class size. This "final decision" prompted
a strike threat by the organization, the filing of a temporary
restraining order, a grievance under the contract, and an unfair
practice charge. The "final decision" of the board of education
did not turn out to be a final decision in the sense encapsulated
in section 3549 and relied upon by the board. Rather, it re-
sulted in increasing the antagonism and unrest between the
parties. The conditions described in this hypothetical series of
events do not seem to comport with the purpose of the EERA
to "promote the improvement of personnel management and
employer-employee relations within the public school systems
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3548.1 (West Supp. 1978).
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in the State of California."' 5
Consider another case in which, after nearly two years of
bargaining, a school board and an exclusive agent of teachers
entered into mediation and fact-finding. Approximately
twenty issues remained at the fact-finding step. Because the
fact-finding chairman recommended several unpopular courses
of action to the board, including provisions for binding arbitra-
tion or grievances, the board rejected the fact-finding recom-
mendations. The board contemplated making the final deci-
sion on all matters under section 3549, but it encountered cer-
tain practical problems: (1) What would be the final product
if the board acts unilaterally? Board rules governing salaries
only? A "bilateral contract" on all matters signed by only one
party (the board)? (2) What would be the result of no action
in terms of employee morale? (3) Would no agreement cause
labor problems for years to come? This dilemma led the parties
to post-fact-finding mediation for several round the clock ses-
sions, expenditure of funds beyond that anticipated by the
board, a strike vote and threatened walkout, and finally a me-
diated settlement which left a residue of animosity and ill will
between the parties on a personal level.
CONCLUSION
THE NEED TO ADD TEETH TO IMPASSE RESOLUTION
In view of the experience in other states and the private
sector, a strengthened form of impasse resolution should be
added to the EERA in order to equalize the relationship be-
tween the parties. The typical conflict situations described
above may, in large measure, be due to the relative newness of
the process and the lack of sophistication on the part of the
parties to the bargaining process. Although the Winton Act
provided some experience in bargaining and was a successful
vehicle when both parties engaged in good-faith efforts to make
the process work, there remain eddies and backwaters where
the Winton Act experience hardly left a scratch upon the real-
ity of resolution of interest disputes.
Despite the words of the statute, a local board of education
does not have, as a practical matter, the final decision-making
power, nor does the employee organization or union have true
parity at the bargaining table. This lack of a balance of power
15. Id. § 3540.
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leads to actions in areas of "perceived" power and may, as a
result, disrupt the total process in a real sense. In sum,
"perceived" rather than real power may lie at the present prob-
lems over the final decision-making process. Bargaining is a
power relationship. In the final analysis, the legislature may
have to place the power to make the final decision in the hands
of outsiders who will compel a settlement in order to preserve
the balance of power and dispel the chaos which may result
from the uses of perceived, but not real, power.
Adolf Berle, in his classic study of power relationships,'6
avers that man, even in the dim mists of antiquity, discovered
that the order and predictability which results from power and
its distribution is preferable to the chaos which exists in the
absence of such power creation, distribution, and use. In Greek
thought, Zeus personified power in its good and bad aspects,
and was much to be preferred over meaningless chaos: "Zeus
personified power, its vices as well as its usefulness. Because
he used power to bring a measure of predictability, and there-
fore order, he became supreme . . .Power, raw and terrible,
was preferable to chaos."' 7 Berle's first law of power is that
power invariably fills any vacuum in human organization. As
between chaos and power, the latter always prevails."
Collective bargaining is an exercise in the creation, garner-
ing, and use of power. Undoubtedly further power sharing will
occur in California public school employer-employee relations.
While this author agrees that the scope of bargaining issue is
all pervasive in the formal relationships which will emerge
under employee relations statutes, it is predicted that scope
issues will be decided much as they have been under federal
laws in the private sector. Since the right to strike is the ulti-
mate power weapon in the arsenal of the union or organization,
the legislature may have to decide to provide such a right in
order to balance the power with or without some compulsory
settlement processes. Finally, if the right to strike is granted,
the legislature will have to carefully consider whether, in order
to further balance the power relationship, the legislative
"superprotections" allowed teachers in the form of tenure and
other benefits should be removed so that true bilateral determi-
nations may be made over job security, wages, and other mat-
ters now fixed by statute.
16. A. BERLE, POWER (1967).
17. Id. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 37.
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